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I. INTRODUCTION
The final draft of the Principles of the Law of Soltware Contracts
(Principles) was approved by the American Law Institute (ALI)
membership in May of 2009. The goal of the project is to "clarify and
unify the law of software transactions." However, the Principles will
not become law in any jurisdiction unless and until a court adopts
them, so only time will tell whether the project will accomplish this
goal. (Of course, we believe that the Principles will be successful!)
Nevertheless, one thing is certain. The current law of software
transactions-a mish-mash of common law, Article 2 of the Uniform
Commercial Code (UCC), and federal intellectual property law, among
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other things-is in dire need of improvement.2 This should not be a
surprise. Most of the bodies of law that courts draw upon to decide
software contract cases predate software and are not responsive to its
needs. But software transactions are too important to be relegated to a
secondhand legal-subject-matter status?
In this Essay, we discuss the nature of the Software Principles and
describe some of what we believe are their highlights. By highlights,
we mean not only Principles that we believe are helpful contributions
to the goal of clarification and unification of software contract law, but
also those that have already received some attention because of their
controversial nature. Specifically, we first explain the focus of our
project, which itself presents some challenging issues. We then
discuss several of the specific Principles. We present the Principles'
treatment of terms that may conflict with federal intellectual property
law. We explain the Principles' approach to the thorny issue of what
constitutes assent to electronic standard forms. We illustrate how the
Principles have modified some of the UCC's warranty rules that,
because of their fogginess, have created much litigation and
controversy. Sticking with warranty issues, we discuss what is
probably the most controversial Principle (at least among software
vendors), namely, the nondisclaimable warranty of no material, hidden
defects. Finally, we set forth the Principles' treatment of automated
disablement of software's functionality.
We only have space for capsule discussions of the above
Principles. For more complete treatment and, for that matter, for
material on other important sections, we advise turning to the
Principles themselves. But before we present our primer, here are two
additional thoughts. First, some writers have noted that many of the
Principles could apply more broadly to other subject matters, as if this
were problematic.' For example, our treatment of e-standard forms
could apply not only to software transactions, but also, for example, to
hard goods and services sold over the Internet. Relatedly, some
scholars have written about the value of general contract law, arguing
2. Id introductory cmt. n. 1 ("[A]cross most of the nation, software licenses exist in
a legislative void. Legal scholars ... have tried to fill that void, but their efforts have not kept
pace with the world of business." (quoting I.LAN Sys., Inc. v. Netscout Serv. Level Corp.,
183 E Supp. 2d 328, 332 (D. Mass. 2002))).
3. See id (discussing the importance of the software industry).
4. See generally Peter A. Alces & Chris Byrne, Is It Time for the Restatement of
Contracts, Fourth?, 11 DUQ. Bus. L.J. 195 (2009). We do not comment here on most of the
observations in other articles in this Symposium.
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that something may be sacrificed in the process of specialization Do
these observations trouble us? Is there harm in breaking out from
general contract law particular subject-matter principles?6 We think
not. Indeed, we would welcome the application of the Principles to
other subject matters where appropriate. Law reform has to start
somewhere, and a focus on software transactions that are currently
governed by law that predates even an inkling of the digital revolution,
makes sense. In drafting the Principles (with great help from our ALI
advisers, council members, and consultative group), we were able to
focus on, among other things, the nature of software, the types of
software transactions, and the parties to them. We could evaluate
prospective rules in this field against the goals of clarity, efficiency,
and fairness. We could avoid the level of generality in drafting that
often produces legal ambiguity and limited usefulness, while
nevertheless drafting rules that can accommodate future developments.
We could consult with judges, lawyers, and software engineers in the
field during over five years of receiving input and advice. And we
could leave to other law reformers who are evaluating a new set of
issues in another subject area, whether our rules makes sense in their
domain. Ultimately, we believe that lawyers and judges engaged in
software related issues are better off with the Principles as a resource
to help guide them than without them.
Second, we admit to feeling a bit uncomfortable with the
organizers' title of this symposium: The Principles of the Law of
SoRware Contacts: A Phoenix Rising from the Ashes of Article 2B
and UCITA? We doubt that any work, at least on something as
daunting as software transactions, merits the "phoenix" moniker. In
addition, although the Uniform Computer Information Transactions
Act (UCITA) has not been widely adopted, we relied on many of its
ideas and provisions in drafting our Principles.7 We hardly think
UCITA belongs in the ashes.
5. See, e.g., Nathan B. Oman, A Pragmatic Defense of Contract Law, 98 GEO. L.J.
77,114-16 (2009).
6. See generally Robert A. Hillman, Contract Law in Context- The Case of
Soiware Contracts, 45 WAKE FOREST L. REv. (forthcoming 2010).
7. SeeALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 1, introductory cmt.
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I. HIGHLIGHTS
A. Nature of the Pnnciples
The project is not an ALI restatement of the law, but as the name
suggests, "Principles." We were inspired by other ALl projects such as
Prnciples of Corporate Governance and Pnnciples of the Law of
Family Dissolution.8 As we state in the introduction to the Principles,
In light of the many percolating legal issues that pertain to the
formation and enforcement of software agreements, an attempt to
"restate" this law would be premature.... Instead of restating the law, a
"Principles" project accounts for the case law and recommends best
practices, without unduly hindering the law's adaptability to future
developments.9
Accordingly, many of the "black letter" Principles are broadly drafted,
with elaboration in the comments.
The Principles apply to software transfers supported by
consideration, meaning software contracts, including contracts denomi-
nated as licenses, sales, or access contracts.'" For those who need a
brief refresher on consideration, a promisor receives consideration for
a promise if the promisor extracts from the promisee a return promise
or a performance in exchange for the promise." The promisor's motive
to gain something as the price of its promise (called consideration)
need be only one of many reasons for making the promise.'2
Focusing on software contracts, regardless of the type, avoids
issues arising from the label the parties place on a transaction.
Regardless of whether the parties call their transaction a license, sale,
lease, or something else, the Principles would apply and courts would
avoid the question of whether the UCC's Article 2, common law,
UCITA, or some other law governs the transaction." Further,
8. PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
(2000); PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS (1992).
9. ALl PRINCIPLES, supra note 1, introductory cmt.
10. Id. § 1.06(a), § 1.06 cmt. b. For application of the consideration principle to
software transactions, see Robert A. Hillman/ & Maureen A. O'Rourke, Retthnking
Consideration in the Electronic Age, 61 HASTINGS L.J. 311 (2009).
11. ROBERT A. HILLMAN, PRINCIPLES OF CONTRACT LAW 15-18 (2d ed. 2009).
12. Id at 18 (citation omitted).
13. The Principles thus define "transfer" to include all methods of exchange, whether
a sale, license, or something else. See ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 1, § 1.01(m). Defining
transfer in this way may be troubling to some who associate a specialized meaning with the
term from intellectual property law or elsewhere. We, however, are not troubled. It is
common for drafters of documents, including contracts and statutes, to define terms for the
specific effort.
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transactors' rights under the Principles generally do not depend on the
label a drafter places on a transaction, but on "the legitimacy of the
process of contracting and the meaning and appropriateness of the
substantive terms."'" For example, an end user's right to ignore a term
forbidding reverse engineering of the software should not depend on
whether the parties labeled their transaction a sale or a license, but on
the true substance of the deal and the term itself, including whether the
term contradicts, for example, federal intellectual property law, state
public policy or whether it is unconscionable. 5  Of course, the
distinction between a sale and a license may still be relevant. For
example, an end user's right to ignore a term forbidding transfer of the
software should depend in part on whether a "first sale" or an
exhaustion of rights has occurred under federal intellectual property
law.6  When relevant, courts can look to case law to make the
distinction between a sale and license.
One scope issue that stands out is whether the Principles should
apply to open source software transfers.'7 The answer is "yes" for
several reasons. On the formal legal side, as long as the transferee
supplies consideration for the software and assents to the terms of the
license, the parties have formed a contract, open source or not. So, for
example, if a transferee pays money for open source software, the
Principles apply. Very often, however, no money changes hands in
open source transactions. The Principles also apply if an agreement
14. Id. ch. 1, topic 2, summary overview.
15. Id.
16. The Principles' position is that even if the transfer resembles a sale, in which case
the intellectual property interest in freedom from restrictions on resale is at its height, courts
should consider a number of factors before holding the restriction unenforceable. See id
§ 1.09.
17. For a discussion of open source software, see Hillman & O'Rourke, supra note
10, at 313-14:
Although there are many different open source licenses, the General Public License
(GPL) is likely the most common. To achieve the goal of creating a software
commons, the GPL authorizes copyholders to transfer, copy, or modify the
software subject to a series of restrictions. The restrictions are designed to further
an environment of openness by requiring copyholders to reveal the source code to
transferees of any software products that are derived from the original source code
(often referred to as the "copyleft" provision) and to transfer such software under
the same terms as the GPL ("same terms" provision), making the terms themselves
"viral" in nature.
Id (footnotes omitted).
"Copyleft" also refers to the overall system consisting of a number of terms that
effectively prevent a licensee from asserting proprietary rights in the original open source
software and any derivative works thereof. See Ira V Heffan, Note, Copyleft. Licensing
Collaborative Works in theDigitalAge, 49 STAN. L. REv. 1487, 1507-08 (1997).
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includes nonmonetary consideration, such as a promise to pay for
maintenance of the software or ancillary services, or to provide the
transferor with the source code of the transferee's own software.'
8
Open source licenses also often include terms such as requiring
the licensee to distribute derivative software under the same terms as
the initial transfer (same terms provision) or requiring the licensee to
keep the source code open if it transfers the software (copyleft
provision).'9 Such terms also should constitute consideration under
contract law because the terms "go beyond simply defining the
boundaries of the license[s]" by creating affirmative obligations if the
transferee itself distributes the software." Further, licensors have
multiple motives for "bargaining for" these provisions. For example,
many licensors of open source software seek to further their philo-
sophy of openness by creating a software commons to increase the
uses of software for the benefit of society.2 Courts have found that
such altruistic motives constitute evidence of bargained-for
consideration." Licensors may benefit more directly by entering
lucrative service contracts or by enhancing their reputations, which
may lead to successful entrepreneurial activities."
Technicalities of the consideration doctrine aside, it is an open
secret that the consideration doctrine is sufficiently pliable to embrace
enforcement of promises that increase society's welfare, at least when
the promises are capable of efficient judicial administration." And the
value of open source software is not debatable. Open source software
products are useful and important, and the movement has achieved its
goal of increasing public access to software.25 In addition, "[T]he
collaborative model arguably promotes better quality and reliable
software in large part because skilled participants have ... the luxury
of ample spare time to devote to software development....,,""
Still, open source licenses raise novel issues and some vendors
have sought their exclusion from the Principles. But a comment to the
18. ALl PRINCIPLES, supra note 1, § 1.06 cmt. d.
19. Hillman & O'Rourke, supmr note 10, at 328-29.
20. Id. at 329.
21. Id. at 330.
22. See, e.g., Allegheny Coll. v. Nat'l Chautauqua County Bank, 159 N.E. 173, 176
(N.Y. 1927).
23. Hillman & O'Rourke, supra note 10, at 329.
24. Id. at 321-22.
25. Id. at 330.
26. Id.
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Principles further explains why the project should apply to open-
source licenses:
The open-source movement clearly raises novel issues, and some
rules applicable to proprietary software apply awkwardly to open-
source software. For example, open-source agreements generally do
not restrict use, transfer, copying, or modification of the software,
whereas such terms are common in agreements for the transfer of
proprietary software and raise enforcement issues. Open-source
software also raises unique issues of its own, for example, with respect
to warranties and remedies. Unlike proprietary software, where
warranties and remedies fit comfortably within a legal framework, the
development of open-source software is often a large, dispersed group
effort and, despite the quality and reliability of some open-source
products, transferors often have little control over product quality.
Nevertheless, open-source software transfers share many characteris-
tics with proprietary software. For example, the legality of restrictions
on the use of open-source software, such as the "copyleft" requirement
that a transferee provide the source code to recipients of the transferee's
products derived from the transferor's source code, raise questions
analogous to the enforcement of proprietary software's various
restrictions on use. In addition, open-source licenses often announce
that copying, exchanging, or modifying software constitutes acceptance
of the terms of the license. This formation strategy raises issues
analogous to the enforcement of shrinkwrap agreements in the
proprietary setting. These Principles therefore can accommodate open
source, with carve-outs and special rules as necessary.
As long as the Principles fulfill their goal of facilitating software
exchanges, open source transfers belong in the Principles.
Here is one final thought before we turn to specific substantive
Principles: Despite some assertions to the contrary, the underlying
normative theory that guides the Principles is freedom of contract.28
The Principles contain only a few mandatory rules and many of these
follow UCC Article 2 or common law.9
27. ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 1, § 1.06 cmt. d (internal reference omitted).
28. See, e.g., Florencia Marotta Wurgler, Presentation at AALS Annual Meeting,
Section on Commercial and Related Consumer Law (Jan. 9, 2010). Marotta-Wurgler asserts
that the Principles assume market failure in the context of e-standard forms. But the
Principles apply the common-law objective test of assent and set out a safe harbor that would
satisfy this objective test. See ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 1, § 2.02 & cmts. a-h.
29. Mandatory rules include id. § § 1.13 (choice of law), 1.14 (forum selection), 2.03
(contract modification), 3.05(b) (warranty of no material hidden defects), 4.02 (liquidated
damages), and 4.03 (automated disablement).
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B. Enforcement of Terms Under Federal Intellectual Property Law
As with issues of scope, questions of enforceability of contractual
provisions in light of federal intellectual property policy are complex.
Aspects of software are often protected by state trade-secret law as
well as federal copyright and patent law, and these sets of law are not
necessarily consistent in their view of what contractual clauses are
troublesome. Moreover, courts and commentators disagree on when,
if ever, a court should hold a contractual provision unenforceable
because it conflicts in some way with federal intellectual property
law.3 This situation leaves a state court in a difficult position when
faced with a challenge to enforceability of a contractual provision
based on federal law. The Principles provide such courts with
guidance.
Doubtlessly, some will find this guidance lacking in one way or
another." Like UCITA's drafters, we found it difficult to provide
definitive rules that would satisfy all interested groups. UCITA
eventually settled on a provision stating simply: "A provision of this
[Act] which is preempted by federal law is unenforceable to the extent
of the preemption.' '" In our earliest meetings, we attempted to provide
more guidance and even discussed including in the "black letter" a list
of certain common contractual provisions that would be presumptively
unenforceable. Our advisers and the members convinced us that this
approach was inappropriate not so much because it failed to reflect the
law as it is but because of the changing nature of courts' interpretations
of relevant federal doctrine and the always-fuzzy contours of
preemption law generally. They felt this to be an area particularly
appropriate for development through the common law. This approach
resulted in "black letter," comments, and Reporters' Notes that an ALI
Council member once said resembles a "research paper." This does
not trouble us because we believe that the section outlines the relevant
policy considerations and factors courts should consider in assessing a
challenge to enforceability of a contractual provision based on
inconsistency with intellectual property law.
The Principles take the position that courts should respect
freedom of contract and generally enforce provisions affecting
30. Id. § 1.09 crnt. a.
31. See, e.g., Juliet M. Moringiello & William L. Reynolds, Whats Software Got To
Do wrth It? The ALl PrInciples of the Law of Software Contracting, 84 TUL. L. REv. 1541
(2010).
32. UNIFORM COMPUTER INFORMAION TRANSACTIONS ACT § 105 (2002) (alteration
in original).
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intellectual property rights unless they conflict with a mandatory rule
of intellectual property law. For example, parties cannot contract
around the rule that an oral transfer of copyright ownership is
unenforceable. 3
The Principles also recognize that not all contracts are alike and
that how a contract is formed may have implications for the
enforceability analysis. In short, case law reveals that courts are most
concerned with state laws that have the effect of setting up a scheme of
protection that would compete with the federal system.' Because
contracts affect only the parties to them, federal interests are generally
not implicated in state enforcement of a private contract. However,
when software is marketed under standard-form nonnegotiated
agreements that modify rights the transferee would otherwise have
under intellectual property law, state court enforcement of the
agreement begins to look much more like a state scheme that competes
with the federal system: End users cannot bargain to obtain the
product with the rights the federal law would provide.
Thus, the Principles state, "A term of an agreement is
unenforceable if it ... conflicts impermissibly with the purposes and
policies of federal intellectual property law . . . ."" Some find this
formulation odd-what is the difference between a conflict and an
impermissible conflict? But the issue of conflict is, indeed, a matter of
degree. If state enforcement of a term is likely to encourage providers
to forego or routinely modify the federal law, the term may be
unenforceable. If a provision conflicts in some minor way, it is
enforceable. The Principles therefore set forth considerations for
courts to assess in determining the extent of the conflict."
33. See 17 U.S.C. § 204(a) (2006).
34. ALl PRINCIPLES, supra note 1, § 1.09 cmt. c.
35. Id § 1.09.
36. Id § 1.09 cmt. c. The comment provides in part:
Factors a court should consider in deciding whether to hold a term of an agreement
unenforceable include:
(1) whether the agreement effectively expands the scope of the transferor's
rights or contracts the scope of the transferee's rights to its own creations
under federal law;
(2) whether the agreement was negotiated and the parties' relative bargaining
power;
(3) whether and to what degree enforcement of the provision is likely to affect
competition adversely;
(4) whether and to what degree enforcement of the provision is likely to affect
innovation adversely; and
(5) whether the transferee has the opportunity to obtain the software free of the
restriction at a reasonable price.
2010] 1527
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Others may argue that "purposes and policies" preemption is too
uncertain, and will increase costs to transferors who will not know in
advance what provisions are enforceable. We are not troubled by this
objection. First, we are simply restating existing law.7 Second, we
provide many examples to guide courts in assessing particular
provisions. 8
The Principles differ from UCITA in their treatment of an
important topic: the enforceability of contractual provision against
reverse engineering. Section 118 of UCITA provides that such
contractual provisions are unenforceable in certain circumstances
without regard to the nature of the contract." We chose not to adopt
this approach because we believe that the kind of contract should
matter. For example, the argument for preemption of a provision
against reverse engineering is stronger in the context of a standard-
form nonnegotiated agreement and when the transferee cannot
purchase the right to reverse engineer at a reasonable price than in the
context of a negotiated agreement.4"
Id.
37. Id. § 1.09 cmts. a, c.
38. Id. § 1.09 cmt. c, illus. 2-7.
39. UNIFORM COMPUTER INFORMATION TRANSACTIONS ACT § 118(b), § 118 cmt. 5
(2002).
Notwithstanding the terms of a contract subject to this [Act], a licensee that
lawfully obtained the right to use a copy of a computer program may identify,
analyze, and use those elements of the program necessary to achieve
interoperability of an independently created computer program with other
programs, including adapting or modifying the licensee's computer program, if:
(1) the elements have not previously been readily available to the licensee;
(2) the identification, analysis, or use is performed solely for the purpose of
enabling such interoperability; and
(3) the identification, analysis, or use is not prohibited by law other than this
[Act].
Id § 118(b) (alterations in original).
40. Professors Moringiello and Reynolds note that we could have done more to
provide guidance regarding the enforceability of provisions that restrict or place conditions on
transfer. Moringiello & Reynolds, supm note 3 1. However, we decided that this area was
best left to further common law development against the backdrop of the policy
considerations we note. The case law determining whether a transfer is one of ownership
rights in the intellectual property is reasonably well-developed and we saw no need to
comment on it or to interfere with decisions of state courts on whether a particular
transaction--for example, a merger--constitutes a transfer of ownership. The more difficult
questions arise when a transfer is prohibited or severely restricted. Here again, the policy
concerns are paramount in the context of a nonnegotiated, standard-form agreement when the
transferee cannot purchase those rights for a reasonable price. The law here is inconsistent in
both copyright and patent law. A state court will have to work with the federal precedent as it
is and we hope that our guidance will assist them in that interpretation.
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The Principles depart from the existing cases (which are small in
number) that hold that a party defending against a breach of contract
claim may not use a right holder's misuse of the right as a defense."
Misuse is an equitable doctrine developed first under patent law and
later imported by courts into copyright law. An accused infringer may
use misuse as a defense when the right holder has exceeded the scope
of its rights in an anticompetitive way. If a court finds misuse, the
right holder may not enforce its rights until it has purged itself of the
misuse. We believe that the policy bases that support the misuse
doctrine are essentially the same as those that underlie the preemption
analysis and thus that the law would be better served by allowing
parties to use misuse as a defense in a breach of contract action. 2
Ultimately, state law would frustrate the goals of the intellectual
property system if a right holder could enforce a provision in a breach
of contract action that constitutes misuse under federal intellectual
property law.
The Principles' treatment of public policy supplements the
section on unenforceability of terms under federal intellectual property
law.3 Here we draw from the work of Jonathan Franklin and Professor
Jerome Reichman." They suggest that public policy has a role to play
in policing contractual provisions in standard forms that conflict with
traditional federal and state intellectual property policies." We believe
that their approach is essentially sound but do caution against judicial
refusals to enforce terms in cases in which the public policy is not
clearly fundamental.
C Assent to Electronic Standard Forms
This problem addressed by the Principles hardly needs an
explanation. It is common knowledge (and well-documented) that
people do not read their standard forms before signing them and that
the electronic age has not mitigated the problem, but may have
exacerbated it. 6 Entering contracts over the Internet is easy and fun.
41. ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 1, § 1.09 cmt. d.
42. Id
43. Id § 1.10.
44. J.H. Reichman & Jonathan A. Franklin, Privately Legislated Intellectual Property
Rights: Reconciling Freedom of Contract with Public Good Uses ofInformation, 147 U. PA.
L. REV. 875, 926, 930 (1999).
45. See id.
46. See generally Robert A. Hillman & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Standard-Form
Contracting in the Electronic Age, 77 N.YU. L. REv. 429 (2002); Robert A. Hillman, Online
Consumer Standard Form Contracting Practces: A Survey and Discussion of Legal
2010] 1529
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People seduced by the speed and ease of such transactions expect
instant gratification, which hardly portends careful reading and
analysis of standard forms.4 Yet the forms sometimes include
"dangerous terms" that a careful reader would want to reject, such as
automatic renewals, the right to modify the agreement without notice,
and the right to download spyware on the transferee's computer.8
Further, more and more people download software over the Internet
and click "I agree" to the governing e-standard forms so that the
problem is now ubiquitous. What to do?
The Principles adopt the common law contract-formation rule
based on whether a reasonable person would believe the transferee
intends to contract. 9 Of course, this provision hardly resolves the issue
of assent raised by e-standard forms. However, the Principles also set
forth a safe harbor transferors can follow to ensure enforcement of
their forms." The goal is to encourage practices that promote
disclosure and reading of terms before a transferee commits to a
transfer.
We admit to being somewhat baffled by some analysts' resistance
to the Principles' disclosure orientation." Even if transferees continue
not to read-and we have no illusions that reading will increase
Implications, in CONSUMER PROTECTION IN THE AGE OF THE 'INFORMATION ECONOMY' 283
(Jane K. Winn ed., 2006).
47. Robert A. Hillman, Online Boilerplate. Would Mandatory Website Disclosure of
E-Standard Terms Backfire?, 104 MI. L. REv. 837, 849-52 (2006).
48. See ALl PRINCIPLES, supra note 1, ch. 2, topic 2, summary overview (citing
Annalee Newitz, Dangerous Terms." A Users Guide to EULAs, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND., Feb.
2005, http://www.eff.org/wp/dangerous-terms-users-guide-eulas).
49. Id. § 2.02(b).
50. Id. § 2.02(c). In part, the section provides:
(c) A transferee will be deemed to have adopted a standard form as a contract if
(1) the standard form is reasonably accessible electronically prior to initiation of
the transfer at issue;
(2) upon initiating the transfer, the transferee has reasonable notice of and
access to the standard form before payment or, if there is no payment, before
completion of the transfer;
(3) in the case of an electronic transfer of software, the transferee signifies
agreement at the end of or adjacent to the electronic standard form, or in the
case of a standard form printed on or attached to packaged software or
separately wrapped from the software, the transferee does not ... return the
software unopened ... within a reasonable time after the transfer; and
(4) the transferee can store and reproduce the standard form if presented
electronically.
Id
51. See, e.g., Omfi Ben-Shahar, The Myth of the "Opportunity to Read" in Contract
Law, 5 EuR. REV. Cowr. L. 1 (2009).
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significantly-the practices increase the oppotmityto read. This may
be all we can hope for:
Increasing the opportunity to read supports autonomy reasons for
enforcing software standard forms and substantiates Karl Llewellyn's
conception of transferees' "blanket assent" to reasonable standard
terms, so long as they have had a reasonable opportunity to read them.
Blanket assent means that transferees have delegated to the drafter the
duty of drafting reasonable boilerplate terms, just as they delegate to
software transferors and engineers the duty of creating the appropriate
software for the task at hand.52
Not only does disclosure increase the opportunity to read and
enrich the concept of assent, it is consistent with notions of fair play
and fundamental due process. For example, due process requires "fair
warning," which in the context of criminal law means that citizens can
be punished only for violating laws on the books that "explicit[ly] ...
inform those who are subject to [the law] what conduct on their part
will render them liable to its penalties."53 But, of course, people rarely
read or understand most criminal statutes. The point is that people
cou/dread them, just as increasing access to standard forms creates an
opportunity for people to read them.' To cite another example, "the
importance of the common law principle of stare decisis does not
depend on the proposition that people actually know and understand
precedent, but on the notion that the legal texts are available to them."5
The particulars of the safe harbor are not onerous and should cost
transferors very little. To ensure enforcement of a standard form
(assuming it does not violate federal law, state public policy, or the
unconscionability standard), a transferor must make its standard form
reasonably accessible electronically prior to any particular transaction,
the transferee must receive reasonable notice of and access to the
standard form upon initiating a transaction and prior to payment or
completion of the transaction, the transferee must signify agreement at
the end of or adjacent to an e-standard form, and the form must be
capable of storage and reproduction, such as by printing a hard copy 6
(The Principles also provide analogous requirements for packaged
52. AlI PRINCIPLES, supm note 1, ch. 2, topic 2, summary overview (footnote
omitted).
53. Keeler v. Superior Court, 470 P2d 617, 626 (1970) (internal quotation marks
omitted) (quoting Connally v. Gen. Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926)).
54. Thanks to Sherry Colb for this observation.
55. Robert A. Hillman & Maureen O'Rourke, Defending Disclosure in Software
Licensing, 77 U. Ctl. L. REv. (forthcoming 2011).
56. Al PRINCIPLES, supra note 1, § 2.02(c).
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software.") Based on these requirements, the transferee can shop
around and compare standard forms prior to initiating a purchase.
Further, the safe harbor's requirement of what amounts to (under
current technology) a "clickwrap" method of completion of a
transaction, in which the transferee must click "I agree" adjacent to or
at the end of the standard form, most closely resembles the signature
requirement of a paper contract. 8 Clickwrap therefore supports the
presumption borrowed from the paper world that a signatory has read
the contract. "Browsewrap," in which the transferee has to browse to
find the governing form, would not suffice to satisfy the safe harbor.9
Other proposals to deal with the problem of the lack of reading of
standard forms include establishing a government agency to review
terms, requiring more extensive clicking (at least of suspect terms), or
creating a Web site that lists onerous terms or rates standard forms.6"
Suffice it to say here that these approaches are either too expensive,
intrusive, or unwieldy, or could easily supplement the disclosure
approach of the Principles. For an example of the latter, the Principles'
disclosure orientation that would make standard forms easily
accessible should facilitate the creation of watchdog sites that would
effectively collect terms that may overreach. If instituted, such Web
sites should create incentives for software vendors to draft fair terms.
D WarrantyIssues
The Principles replace two impenetrable UCC Article 2 express
warranty rules that have produced a great deal of litigation. Instead of
the basis-of-the-bargain test of UCC section 2-313,6" the Principles
provide that a promise or representation creates an express warranty if
57. Id.
58. Id. ch. 2, topic 2, summary overview. For more on clickwrap, see id section 2.01
comment b.
59. Id. For more on browsewrap, see id section 2.01 comment b. For further
elaboration on the merits of disclosure, see Hillman & O'Rourke, supra note 55.
60. See Hillman & O'Rourke, supra note 55; ALl PRINCIPLES, supra note 1, ch. 2,
topic 2, summary overview; Clayton P Gillette, Preapproved Boilerplate, i BORLERPLATE:
THE FOUNDATIONS OF MARKET CONTRACTS (Omri Ben-Shahar ed., 2006); Ben-Shahar, supra
note 51.
61. UCC section 2-313(1) provides in part:
Express warranties by the seller are created as follows: (a) Any affirmation of fact
or promise made by the seller to the buyer which relates to the goods and becomes
part of the basis of the bargain creates an express warranty that the goods shall
conform to the affirmation or promise.
U.C.C. § 2-313(1) (2004).
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a reasonable transferee could rely on it.62 Courts and commentators
have debated endlessly whether "basis of the bargain" requires actual
reliance on a representation or something else." Comment 3 to the
section does not help in stating that "no particular reliance on [an
affirmation of fact or promise] need be shown in order to weave them
into the fabric of the agreement." "[N]o particular reliance" and
"weave them into the fabric of the agreement" seem like phrases
calculated to cause confusion.
The basis-of-the-bargain test's lack of clarity "invites
overreaching by sellers and manipulation by courts. 6 The Principles
therefore drop the test and replace it with an objective test of whether
reliance on the promise or representation would be reasonable.67 This
test embraces and applies the factors necessary to distinguish between
creating an express warranty and mere puffing or sales talk and would
therefore be met when a representation is clear, specific, verifiable and
unconditional.6' As one of us wrote elsewhere, "[s]uch a rule would
clarify that the UCC's 'no particular reliance need be shown' language
really means that no actual reliance must be shown.
69
The Principles also replace UCC section 2-316(1), which states
in part: "Words or conduct relevant to the creation of an express
warranty and words or conduct tending to negate or limit warranty
shall be construed wherever reasonable as consistent ... but ...
negation or limitation is inoperative to the extent that such construction
is unreasonable."'7 Language creating warranties and disclaiming
them cannot be "consistent" and the meaning of this mysterious rule
has also been fought out in the courts.' The Principles therefore adopt
a test alluded to in a comment to section 2-313 that ties enforcement of
62. SeeALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 1, § 3.02(c), § 3.02 cmt. f.
63. See, e.g., id § 3.02 & reporters' notes, cmt. a (and cases cited therein); see also
Robert A. Hillman, UC C Article 2 Express Warranies and Disclaimers in the Twen(y-First
Century, 11 DuQ. Bus. L.J. 167, 168-70 (2009).
64. U.C.C. § 2-313 cmt. 3.
65. Hillman, supra note 63, at 168-70.
66. Id. at 170.
67. Section 3.02(b)(1) through (3) of the Principles provide that an express warranty
may arise if a "reasonable transferee could rely" on an affirmation of fact or promise, a
description, or a demonstration. ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 1, § 3.02(b)(1)-(3).
68. Id § 3.02 cmt. f.
69. Hilman, supra note 63, at 170.
70. U.C.C. § 2-316(1) (2004).
71. See, e.g., ALl PRINCIPLES, supra note 1, § 3.06 & reporters' notes, cmt. a (and
cases cited therein); see also Hillman, supra note 63, at 170-71.
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disclaimers to whether they are "expected."72  This test is also
objective,
meaning that if a reasonable buyer would not expect the disclaimer, it
should not be enforceable. Courts should compare the clarity and
distinctiveness of the language of warranty and disclaimer and the
context in which the seller presents each to determine whether a buyer
should be surprised by the seller's disclaimer. 73
E The Implied Warnty ofNo Hidden Matenal Defects of Which
the Transferor is Aware "
This warranty may be the most controversial Principle, at least
based on the reaction of some software providers." But we take solace
in the fact that business rarely likes new consumer (and here other end-
user) protection laws. Further, as the comment to section 3.05 points
out, subsection (b) does nothing more than memorialize existing law,
"including the contract obligation of good faith, the contract duty to
disclose, and fraudulent-concealment law."76
72. Section 2-316(1) "protect[s] a buyer from unexpected and unbargained language
of disclaimer." U.C.C. § 2-316 cmt. 1. Courts often rely on this comment. See, e.g.,
Manitowoc Marine Group, LLC v. Ameron Int'l Corp., 424 F. Supp. 2d 1119, 1132-33 (E.D.
Wis. 2006); Morningstar v. Hallett, 858 A.2d 125, 130-31 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2004); S. Energy
Homes, Inc. v. Washington, 774 So. 2d 505, 512-13 (Ala. 2000).
73. Hillman, supra note 63, at 171 (footnote omitted). For example:
[I]f a seller's agent very distinctly "guarantees" that a car will get 30 miles per
gallon, a reasonable buyer would expect the seller to stand behind the claim.
However, if a seller clearly states that its promises or representations are not legally
binding, and the seller includes a disclaimer in the written contract, a reasonable
buyer should understand that there are no express warranties. In addition, a
reasonable buyer would not be surprised by a disclaimer if the buyer was involved
in drafting the contract.
Id.
74. ALl PRINCIPLES, supra note 1, § 3.05(b).
75. See, e.g., Letter from the Linux Foundation and Microsoft to authors and
Professor Liebman (May 14, 2009), available at http://microsoftontheissues.com/cs/files/
folders/5090/download.aspx.
76. ALl PRINCIPLES, supra note 1, § 3.05(b), 3.05 cmt. b & reporters' notes, cmt. b
(and cases cited therein).
Under the common law, a contracting party must disclose material facts if they are
under the party's control and the other party cannot reasonably be expected to learn
the facts. Failure to disclose in such circumstances may amount to a representation
that the fact does not exist and may be fraudulent. See, e.g., Hill v. Jones, 725 P2d
1115, 1118-1119 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1986) ("[U]nder certain circumstances there may
be a 'duty to speak.'... [N]ondisclosure of a fact known to one party may be
equivalent to the assertion that the fact does not exist.... Thus, nondisclosure may
be equated with and given the same legal effect as fraud and misrepresentation.").
The Restatement Second of Contracts § 161(b) supports the Ill dictum: "A
person's non-disclosure of a fact known to him is equivalent to an assertion that the
1534
LA W OF SOFTWARE CONTRACTS
The title of this warranty gives away its content. The transferor
must know of the defect at the time of the transfer, the defect must be
material, and it must be hidden. Some large software manufacturers
such as Microsoft claim these tests will "increase[] litigation," a cry
often heard by business in the face of regulation." But the Principles
define each of these elements and largely rely on already tested
standards. The comments elaborate:
The time of the ftansfer is the time of conveyance of rights in the
software or of authorization to access software. If a transferor delivers a
new version of software pursuant to an existing contract, the time of the
transfer of the new version is the time of delivery. However, the
transferor makes a § 3.05(b) warranty only with respect to the new
version. The transferor is not liable under this Section for material
defects in the original version if it did not know of them at the time of
the transfer of the original version.
A material defect consists of a software error serious enough to
constitute a material breach of the contract. Section 3.11 of these
Principles and the well-established common-law material-breach
doctrine, which ask whether the injured party received substantially
what it bargained for and reasonably expected, inform the court's
decision on whether a defect is material. Software that requires major
workarounds to achieve contract-promised functionality and that causes
long periods of downtime or never achieves promised functionality
ordinarily would constitute a material defect.
A hidden material defect means that the defect would not surface
upon any testing that was or should have been performed by the
fact does not exist ... where he knows that disclosure of the fact would correct a
mistake of the other party as to a basic assumption on which that party is making
the contract and if non-disclosure of the fact amounts to a failure to act in good
faith and in accordance with reasonable standards of fair dealing." Section 161,
Comment 4t of the Restatement Second adds: "In many situations, if one party
knows that the other is mistaken as to a basic assumption, he is expected to
disclose the fact that would correct the mistake. A seller of real or personal
property is, for example, ordinarily expected to disclose a known latent defect of
quality or title that is of such a character as would probably prevent the buyer from
buying at the contract price."
Id. § 3.05 reporters' notes, cmt. b.
Subsection 3.05(b) of the Principles applies only if the transferor receives "money or a
ight to payment of a monetary obligation in exchange for the software." ALl PRINCIPLES,
supra note 1, § 3.05(b). So the subsection would not apply to open source transfers that do
not contemplate a payment of money. The Principles take no position on whether such
licensors should also have a duty to disclose. But open-source development often involves
works-in-progress, downloadable at any time, and with many contributors to the project.
Liability may be unwise and unwieldy in this context. See id. §3.05 cmt. b.
77. Letter from the Linux Foundation and Microsoft to authors and Professor
Liebman, supra note 75, at 1.
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transferee. See § 3.06(e) of these Principles. Negligence on the part of
transferors in failing to discover defects is not covered by the Section
and is the subject of products-liability law. Nor does the subsection
displace the law of misrepresentation, which applies to affirmative
statements meant to deceive. As with fraudulent-concealment law,
ordinarily § 3.05(b) should require an intent to deceive, which may be
inferred if a transferor licenses software it knows is materially defective
and knows the user cannot discover it upon an inspection.
Putting together the requirements of transferor actual knowledge of
the defect at the time of the transfer, transferee reasonable lack of
knowledge, and a defect that constitutes a material breach means that a
transferor would not be liable if the transferor has received reports of
problems but reasonably has not had time to investigate them, if the
transferee's problems are caused by uses of which the transferor is
unaware, if the transferor learns of problems only after the transfer, if
the problems are benign or require reasonable workarounds to achieve
functionality78
Not only does existing law support this disclosure Principle, but it
is wise law for many reasons. First, although software is often not
perfect, and users should expect some flaws, software vendors should
disclose known material hidden defects because they are better able to
bear those risks or avoid them. "Hidden material defects, known to the
software transferor but not disclosed, shift costs to the transferee who
cannot learn of the defects until it is too late and therefore cannot
protect itself."79  Further, disclosure increases welfare in that it
"increases ... the likelihood that each party will value what they get
more than what they give up."'8 In addition, disclosure reduces
transaction costs, such as a duplicative (and by definition unavailing)
search by the transferee to ascertain the quality of software.8' Finally,
disclosure will not reduce the transferor's incentive to produce
information in the first place because transferors inevitably will learn
78. Al PRINCIPLES, supra note 1, § 3.05 cmt. b (internal reference omitted).
79. Id
80. Hillman & O'Rourke, supra note 55; see also Alan Strudler, Moral Complexity in
the Law of Nondisclosure, 45 UCLA L. REv. 337, 350 (1997) ("[Tlhe more information
individuals possess about goods they buy and sell, the more reason society has to think that
these goods will go to those who most value them, and hence, the better off society will be.").
81. See, e.g., MICHAEL J. TREBILCOCK, THE LIMITS OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 112
(1993) ("[T]here should be a general presumption in favour of disclosure of material facts
known to one party and unknown to the other," because otherwise people will "invest in
wasteful precautions to generate information about the asset that is already possessed by the
first party."). The transferee's search will be unavailing because the disclosure principle
applies only if the transferee cannot reasonably detect the problem itself.
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about defects in the process of engineering and manufacturing the
software.
82
The implied warranty of no material hidden defects cannot be
disclaimed. A party should not be able to disclaim liability for what
amounts to fraud, and case law supports this idea, too. 3 Further, the
obligation of good faith means that a party cannot hide behind an "as
is" clause or the like when it knows of a material defect that makes the
software largely worthless to the transferee and knows that the
transferee cannot reasonably detect the problem. " Instead, an "as is"
clause should mean that the transferor is not liable for express
promises or implied warranties of merchantability when it does not
know that the software is materially defective and largely worthless.
But a transferor can disclose material defects to insulate itself from
liability under the subsection."
E AutomatedDisablement
According to section 4.03 of the Principles, "'Automated
disablement' means the use of electronic means to disable or materially
impair the functionality of software." ' As a general matter, electronic
self-help was one of the most contentious issues in the drafting of
UCITA. Those who seek to disable software in an automated way fear
that they may have no other effective remedy.7 Those who wish to
limit or prohibit automated disablement worry about security breaches
that the disabling code may make more likely, damage to other files,
and the harm to the business of the transferee who relies on the
software to keep the business running.88
The drafters of UCITA eventually prohibited the use of electronic
self-help.8 But the Principles acknowledge the differing views and
strike a compromise. Section 4.03 and its comments clarify that the
primary focus is on a transferor that reaches in and disables the
software's functionality after an alleged breach by the transferee." In
such circumstances, the transferor may use automated disablement as
82. See Hillman & O'Rourke, supra note 55.
83. ALl PRINCIPLES, supra note 1, § 3.05 reporters' notes, cmt. b.
84. See generally Robert S. Summers, "Good Faith" in General Contract Law and the
Sales Provisions of tle Uniform Commercial Code, 54 VA. L. REv. 195 (1968).
85. ALI PRINCPLES, supra note 1, § 3.05 cmt. b.
86. Id. § 4.03(a).
87. Id. § 4.03 cmt. a.
88. Id
89. SeeUNIFoRM COMPUTER INFORMATION TRANSACTIONS ACT § 816(b) (2002).
90. ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 1, § 4.03(a).
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long as it does not result "in the loss of: (i) rights granted in the
agreement unless the transferee has materially breached and such
rights do not survive the material breach; or (ii) the use of other
software or digital content."9' Automated disablement under the
Principles is also permissible under the same standards if the transferor
is not using it as a remedy after breach, such as when a transferor
builds a "time bomb" into software to reflect a term permitting use for
a limited time.92
The Principles place a number of restrictions on the use of
automated disablement as a remedy for breach.93 It is not available at
all in a standard-form transfer of generally available software (as those
terms are defined in the Principles) or in a consumer agreement.9' A
transferor may use automated disablement as a remedy outside of
these contexts if the transferee's breach is material and automated
disablement is permitted by a conspicuous term in the agreement; the
transferor provides notice and time to cure; and the transferor has
obtained a court order authorizing the disablement.95
Regardless of the context in which a transferor uses automated
disablement, parties cannot contract around the rules for automated
disablement. 6 Additionally a transferee may recover damages for the
transferor's failure to comply with the section regardless of any term to
the contrary in the agreement.97
I. CONCLUSION
There is, of course, much more in the Principles, including an
implied indemnification obligation against infringement, streamlined
parol evidence and interpretation rules focusing on issues that arise in
the software licensing setting, and guidance on breach and remedies in
91. Id. § 4.03(b). A "loss of... rights granted in the agreement" would occur, for
example, if the transferor used a time bomb to disable software before expiration of the
agreed term. Id.
92. Id. § 4.03 cmt. a.
93. Id. § 4.03(c)-(d).
94. Id. § 4.03(c).
95. Id § 4.03(d).
96. Id. § 4.03(f).
97. Id § 4.03(e). The provisions on automated disablement depart from the
Principles' usual approach of freedom of contract. They reflect our belief that a provision
authorizing automated disablement in the event of breach is unexpected, and disclosure is
insufficient in the context of a consumer agreement or standard-form transfer. These are
contexts in which disclosure is unlikely to be effective in bringing home to the transferee the
possibility of automated disablement. The Principles also limit freedom of contract even in
negotiated agreements. We adopted this approach after consideration of all of the conflicting
interests involved and the input of the advisers, consultative group, and ALI members.
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the software context. We believe the entire package should serve
lawyers and judges well. As with any proposal that goes through many
rounds of editing-in our case, over the course of five years of
meetings with the advisers, ALI Members' Consultative Group, the
ALI Council and the ALI membership--it will not make everyone
happy. Now that the ALI membership has adopted the Principles, we
welcome particularly suggestions to courts on how to apply it and how
it might provide further guidance as the law evolves.

